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Practical Noises and Pragmatism 
y oshio Kinokuni:yァポ
Abstract 
Investigating about any practical designation of elements specified by some propεrty， one 
comes across the possibility of applying the philosophical notion of pragmatism 羽Tehere try to 
d巴velopthe pragmatist view on the set-theoretical analysis and treat practical remainders of 
conception along this line 
1. Pragmatist View 
The term 1うragmatism1 has been introduced to denote the general tendency 
to subordinate logical thinking to the ends of practical life and to find the test 
of the truth of ideas in their practical consequences. In the study of mathemat-
ical foundations， ifwe take up the aggregate of elements which are found eligible 
through some practical procedures in comparison with the set which has before-
hand been put forward by abstraction as the total universe containing the above 
aggregate， there may be expected some pragmatist view to give a valid line of 
discussion. Suppose that we have a total set of elements T provided with a 
certain testing device P such that ifぽ Tand P(α) (that is， a is an element of 
T specifically qualified by P)αis called a practical element， and T p is the 
aggregate of al practical elements of T， then the part defined as R(Tp)=T-Tp， 
w hich we call the practical 河川αinderof T (with respect to P)， will make a 
theoretical noise in the meaning that we should ask whether R(Tp) isvoid or 
not. If we have no possitive way really to distinguish unpractical elements from 
practical ones in the construction of T， R(Tp) isexpressly called a ρractical noise. 
1n pragmatism， any conception， ifapart from its practical consequences， should 
be regarded merely as an abstraction without meaning or signi五canceand even-
tually without truth or falsehood11• Under this view， ifthere is no way really 
to prove any element of T to be an unpractical element， R(Tp) may be regarded 
as a void set. However， as a matter of fact， a pragmatist process of conclusion 
should not be a mere formal process of inference. So， itshall not be admissible 
if one， with no further discussions， asserts that any practical noise， in reality， 
gives no other object than a void set. 
The term pragmatization is sometimes used to mean a conduct which repre圃
sents what is imaginary 01' subjective as real 01' actual， or materializes it through 
some physical characterization. So it may aIso be said to be pragmatist if we 
assume a euclidian space (of五nitedimension) to be五lledup by some homogeneous 
*紀国谷芳雄
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medium (say， ether) everywhere equidensely. Then the a priori measure* of a set 
M in this space may be expected to coincide with the total weight of the medium 
which just五l1sthe spatial occupation. of M. The measure of a set so pragma司
tized is called the pragmatist measure. Consequently， we shall take the pragmatist 
measure to be construed as meaning the a priori mesure itself in the sen.se that 
the former is a pragmatization of the latter. 
2. Practical Enumerability 
If there is assumed a sequence of elements X = (ぬ)(ん=1，2，…)， X is regarded 
as an enumerable set. But， ifwe have no way， in advance， to distinguish Xk 
from other elements， the enumerability of X may only be an abstract conception， 
so that， ifwe apply pragmatism， X shall be thought meaningless. In this regard， 
we say 'x is practically enumerable' when Xk is distinguished from other elements 
and if 
二Ll''.， X!c 
are known the next element Xk十1is always exactly determined; and then X is 
called a practical sequence. The enumerability that Cantor assumed in his diago-
nal process was just the practical enumerability. However， when one simply 
assumes such a set M that 
M <[2 (the initial ordinal number of the 3rd class) ， 
then M may not always be thought to be practically enumerable. If M is not 
given to be practically enumerable， i1.1 may be a mere abstract concept and so 
shall be thought to be meaningless. 
If A is a simply ordered set and every element of a set X is denoted as 
x2(AEA)， and X is given as 
x=limx2 ， 
and if there is no sequence (ん)such that 
X= limx2k， 
we may eventually think that there is no practical way to reach X by the elements 
of X， because no stepping of elevation can， by human approach， be realized beyond 
enumerability. Thus we五nda pragmatist ground for andopting the following 
postulate in the course of our empiricist theory of analysis. 
Postulate 1料 . lf A is a simply ordered set and if 
X= limx2， 
ヰ Theempiricist extension of the Lebesgue measure2). 
料 Thispostulate has previously been used and played a key role in theories of a priori measure 
and of empiricist analysis. 
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then there is a prac抗calseqi悦れce(Ak) (CA) such that 
X = lim X'k・
3. Set of Real Numbers 
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We use the convention on the decimal expression that applies the infinite form 
α=O.aj…αη j(an-1) 99… 
instead of the finite one 
α=O.aj・ αη，
so that any real number which is not equal to zero may be promised a unique 
expression of the infinite decimal form. Thus， whenever we assume a positive 
real number x~ 1， we may thake X to be uniquely expressed in the form 
ヱ=0，xjx2・
However， ifthe sequence (ぬ)cannot really be a practical one， X must be a mere 
abstract object and so， in our view， be meaningless. In this regard， we call X 
aρractical (real) nurnber if (ぉ)is a practical sequence. If we denote as 1 = 
(0， 1](=: {x: 0 < X~ 1}) and by 1 p the aggrega te of al practical numbers in 1， the 
remainder 
R(ι)=1-ι 
causes a practical noise. 
We may as practical numbers show 
;π=3山 9 ラ臼nlf，札
but it is evident that practical numbers which are really to be shown by the 
human race can only make an enumerable set in all. However， itis also evident 
that we cannot wholly know what practical numbers will be found in the future. 
While， in our course of logic， the following proposition is proved : 
(k) 
Proposition 1 (Theorern of Cantor). 1p cannot be practically enurnerable. 
Proof. If 1p is practically enumerable， there must be a practical sequence 
(X) (k=1， 2，…) such that 
(k) 
(ん)ι=(X). 
Then， as each X are practical numbers， there are unique in五nitedecimal expres明
slons 
(ん) (k) (長)
X= O，xjx2・・ . 
Let the function 9 (x) be de岳民das 
(331) 
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g(x) = x十1when x< 9， 
=x-1 when x=9， 
(k) 
and let ~k be de五nedby ~k = σ(じら)(んニ1，2，…)， then 
~ = O'~1;2 ・・・
(k) 
gives a practical number which cannot be found in the sequence (x)， whereas it 
is clear tha t 
。<~ミミ 1 ラ
and hence 
ミモIp，
which gives a contradiction. 
Now let us turn to the question of the practical noise R(Ip). If we take x 
to belong to 1， x is usually expected to be written in the form 
ヱ=O.X1X2・・ ， 
so that x may be expected as a pratical number. Butラ inour view， this cannot 
be assured when the sequence (xk) is not found as a practical one. In any actual 
work， ifxE 1 is assumed，ヱ is either (i) really a practical number， or (i) not yet 
practically shown. In case of (i)， ifwe need exactly to describe x， we may have 
the following two ways: (1) x今O.X1X2…ぶ円 or(2) O.X1X2…ι<X<O.X1X2…ゐ十1・
In the case of (1) it is thought possible that x = O.X1X2…ι， and in the case of 
(2)， as a matter of fact， the interval (O.XIX2'" xm O.X1X2…Xn+l) is taken as the 
object of observation insteacl of the ghost point x. Such being the conclitions， 
it may be saicl that our actual work is always tightly bouncl to practical numbers 
and hence R(Ip) here causes no real obstruction. Consequently， we may say that 
R(Ip) pragmatistly leaks no part of it really to e宜ect，so that R(Ip) may be 
regarcled to be cleletable from our course of analysis. 
If a fact is， through our pragmatist view， clemonstratecl， we say that it is， 
zn enψiricist pragmatism， gainecl. Then， fr・omthe above， we have: 
Proposition 2. In erzρiricist 1りragmatismヲ itis admissible that R(Ip)=必.
4. Quasi -Practical Space 
Supposing that T is a metric space ancl T p the completion of T pてwe，1n 
this section， will exami田 whatmay happen when R(T p) (= T -T p)*必.
We denote by Ix-zl the distance between x and z of T and call a set 
S (z， r)clefined as 
S(z， r)= {x: Ix-zl = r} 
* The subspace of T which consists of al practical points (i. e.， practical elements) of T. 
(332) 
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aφhere in T. Then， ifwe de五neB(z， r)by 
it is evident that 
B(zヲめ=US(z，ρ) ， 
ρ~T 
(Vr>O) (B(z， 1・)nfp*0).二';.ZET p・
Therefore， ifzεR(T p)， itfollsws that 
(ヨに>0)(B(.z， Tz) n T p=必)
which implies that 
B(z， rz)CR(T p). 
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Defi.nition. If R(T p) does not contain any interior point， T is called a 
quasiアracticalゃαce.
Then， from the above discussion we conclude: 
P:roposition 3. 11 T isαmetric学ace，101' T to be quαSlすractical，it is 
necessary and sufficient that 
R(Tp) =の，
th正ltis， 
Tc_二Tp ・
If it is unprovable that RCl~>)手必， then T is called a d切selycomρutable 
set (with respect to P). The case R(Tp)=必 givesan insta配 eof s山 ha T. 
Proposition 4. If T is a metric学αceand is densely conψutable，訪問 T
is necessarily quasiアractical.
Demonstration. If there exist a point z and a positive real number九 such
that B(z， 1'z)CR(t p)ラ thenit follows that R(Tp)手必 Then，the apodosis part 
is readily obtained. 
5. Family of Borel sets 
Let the total aggregate of ordinal numbers of the 2nd class be denoted byア
S. Then， in regard to Postulate 1， S cannot be treated as a determinate set， 
because S cannot be finished by any enumerable stepping in terms of its segments， 
whereas the construction of S may not bεobtained without the stepping increase 
of orders of its elements. Thus we have the following conviction to be valid. 
Proposition 5 (Fundamental Claim in the Empiricist Analysis). If a set is 
given its ordinal to be 01 the 3rd clαs 日ithno other 乎ecifo:•αtion to look into 
it， itis 01 an unfinished collection and cannot be regarded as a determinate seι 
A family B is the family of Borel sets if making use of ordinal numbers B 
can be classi五edin classes B的 whereα<Q (the initial ordinal of the 3rd class)， 
(333) 
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in the following manner: 
(i) the class Bo is the family of al closed sets; 
(i) ifα=え+n， A. being a limit ordinal， and if n is an odd integer， Bαis the 
family of al sets of the form 
U:~lXη; 
(ii) if n is an even integer， Bαis the family of al sets of the form 
n:~lXn ; 
XJ， X2，… in (i) or (ii) are sets which belong to classes of indiees smaller thanα. 
According to Proposition 5， the family B must be of an unfinished collec由
tion. However， any set X of B may be regarded as a practical object if an 
index αis distinctly given such as X E B帥 becausethen X may be reconstructed 
by enumerable compositions of union-makings and product-makings from certain 
sets of the class Bo. Conversely， any practical set of B may reasonably defined 
as a set which is produced by enumerble compositions of union-makings and 
product-makings from sets of Bo and so belongs to a class Bαfor which αlS 
distinctly determined. If X is simply assumed to be a set of B and the index 
of the class containing X is not settled， then X is only an abstract object and， 
in our pragmatist view， isto be cosidered meaningless. Thus we conclude: 
Proposition 6. The fami~ッ of Borel sets is of an 包ηfiJ泊shedcollection. 
Howeverヲ itc側 ber巳cgardeddensely computable and so，αs a 悦 atterof fact， 
can be regarded to have no pr.αcticαd noise. 
In the above the initial class Bo is not discussed in detail， but it is pragma-
tistly possible to show that Bo may also be considered to have no practical noise. 
6. On Probabilism 
In this section， sets of points are uniformly restricted within a euclidian 
space of五nitedimension E and every point of E is assumed to be equi田probable，
that is， occurrences of any two points of E are always reckoned to be of equal 
probability. The probability that an aleatory variable point x， which is restricted 
within a given set K， occurs in a subset M of K， has usually been defined by 
Pr(xEI'1cK) =伝Mj伝K， (6.1) 
where i五J.11means the a priori measure of M and K is rather assumed to be 
a simple四五guredset of which the measure value 伝K is evidently known (e. g.， 
interiors of a sphere or a rectangle). In this case the practicality of Pr will 
naturally hinge upon the practicality of 伝NI，and so， practical sets in respect to 
Pr shall coincide with practical sets in respect to弘
Stochastic books de五nePr by another approach. They五rsttake a so-called 
random sample 
X]， X2， .， XN (6.2) 
(334) 
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from within the set K， and then， if
X k1， Xk:， ・・，XkJ(N) 
are al of its points which belong to M， they consider the ratio 
J(N)jN 
to be an approximation of Pr by means of the sample (6.2). On this line Pr is 
evidently de五nedby 
Pr(xEMcK) = lim J(N)jN. 
λ7→∞ 
This way of definition may literally be very practical， because its process of 
approaching is made up through an accumulation of actual practices of examina-
tions. However， ifwe thereof make a theoretical inspection， we forthwith find 
an important omission， that is， the omission of assurance for the unique conver-
gence of the sequence (J(N)jN) (N=l， 2，…). 1n this context， there are unde-
niably found various sequences (J(N)川り whichgive several conditions of conver-
gence， and the possibility of such severalty may reasonably be explained by the 
relative formula 
Pr(xEMcK， (1)= Sω(X) dx/ Sω(ヱ)dx (6.3) 
xEM xEK 
the left-hand of which means the relative probability of McK in respect to the 
weight function ωThe random幽samplingapproach is considered to be defined 
as an approach which corresponds to the case (Vx) (ω(x)=l) in (6.3). Hence the 
practical noise of this case will hinge upon the noise about the practical possi-
bility of the uniform event 
(γxEK) (ω(x) = 1). (6.4) 
But， in effect， itis found very complicate to enforce (6.4). 
Finally， there may be pointed out a physicalistic line to translate Pr as the 
mean density of the medium occupying M amomg K. In this connection， dis-
cussions inevitably regress toward the constructive formula (6.1) on the interpre-
tation that 伝 meansthe pragmatist measure. Our investigation thus shall wholly 
be focussed on the subject of m・measurability.
7. Pragmatist iルMeasurability
A determInate set M in a space E may generally be characterized by the 
property 
(VxεFJ) (xEM. V.xr[_M). (7.1) 
However， in pragmatism， some notion so to say， of a practical (or practically 
determinate) set will be needed in addition. A partial characterization of such 
a set may be given by the following. 
(335) 
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Criterion P.σM is a 1うracticalseムM has no 1うroper砂町hichis essen・
tially considered meaningless. 
In Section 1 we introduced the pragmatist 伝・measureto be put forward as 
a pragmatist interpretation of the 伝-measure. If we simply stand on this view-
point， any set non-ルmeasurablemay be thought to be a meaningless object， 
because any set having a determinate occupation in (a euclidian space) E must 
have a unique 伝-value(or mノ幽measurevalue) to be determined as the total weight 
of the medium just五llingits sptaial occupation. However， such a view seems 
as too much trusting to the physicalistic conviction on the phenomenal construc圃
tion of a (euclidian) space. So， in this section， we try mathematically to develop 
a rather detailed course of discussions. 
If a proposition ，._ p cannot be considered to be true， we say p is destined. 
For instance， ifthe relation 
伝1'v1= 0 
is not considered to hold， then it shall be destined that 
t五1¥1>0. (7.2) 
1n this case， M is not necessarily promised to be品measurable. (7.2) only means 
that the total weight of the medium filling the spatial occupation of 1'v1 must be 
estimated to be positive. 
However， in case of (7.2)， ifM is a practical set， there must be at least one 
伝-measurablesubset N in M such that 
t五λT>u，
because， ifthere is no such N， the destination (7.2) can be no other than a mere 
abstract assumption and so only meaningless. Thus we may， by Criteion P， 
conclude: 
Proposition 7 (Prinaple of Null-1¥1easure Assertion). If M isαpractical 
set and 
(VXcl'vl) (X is measurable.二}.mX口 0)， 
then it must be that M is i元-measurableand 
mM=O. 
We may really decide 品measuresfor many sets of points in E and such 
sets may directly be thought as practical ones. But whether there is a practical 
non-iふmeasurableset or not is not yet evidentlyァsettled. 'l{ e will here， on setting 
the following axiom， look into this question. 
Axiom P. If M，λ(ん=1，2，…)a何 allpractical sets， then s的
Mk-Mj， u1¥1k， and nMk 
α:re practicαd. 
(336) 
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Proposition 8. グseお
Mjr:;.二λf2E-..
α:l are 11元世悦Eα~surable and 
λ1= UMk， 
then M is m・Jnεαsur，αtbleand 
mM = lim m，M/c. (7.3) 
Demonstration. If (7.3) Is not assured， apparently it must be destined that 
復.l¥;1>limi五M"，
so that there exists a positive real number o such that 
m，(λ1-A1k)>o 
is destined for al ん=1，2，.一 Then，since 
J.V!-J.V!1三M-M2三…ラ
for the set N = n (J.V!-J.i;f/c) it must be destined that 
mN~ò. 
(7.4) 
(7.5) 
Since N is a void set， (7.5) cannot be destined， so that the assumption (7.4) should 
eventually be a mere abstract one (and so meaningless). Then， by Axiom P and 
Criterion P， we have (7.3) to be left as the only case. 
When A1 is a practical set， itmay readily be seen that there exists a sequence 
of 伝'，-measurable(and hence practical) sets川;fk)such that 
λ;flCM2r:;.二・・E二M
and any practical subset of N = ]1，1-U .1i17.o can have no other 品valuethan zero. 
Then， by Proposition 7， N is品measurableand i:百iN= 0， and， by Proposition 8， we 
have 7n(UMk)=lim 勿Mk• Hence i五λ1consequently is decided. Thus we have: 
Proposition 9. Any pr刀cticalset is m・measurable.
Now we may say that we here are in the place to take up the problem of 
the noise between the family of determinate sets and that of practical sets. 1t 
seems apparently possible to delete the noise away. But we will here simply note 
that the formula (7.1) itself may not be considered as a complete expression， in 
some more stringent sense of philosophy. 
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